Christchurch Press Editorial – 13 Feb 12

The navy too nonchalantly accounts for the withdrawal from service of HMNZS Canterbury – the fleet’s $177 million flagship and only transport vessel – for seven months as it undergoes repairs. The work has been planned and would not affect exercises or tasks, a Defence Force spokeswoman, Katherine O’donnell, says. If the need for an amphibious vessel arose, Canterbury could be called into service rapidly or the Australian navy could be asked to help. But the reality is that a big hole has been opened in New Zealand’s defence capability and it could not be filled as easily as the Defence Force suggests.
Rapid deployment is usually crucial in the emergencies that the military are expected to attend. A major weather event in the Pacific Islands or civil disturbances there, for instance, may well require the intervention of more military personnel and equipment than could be transported by New Zealand’s rickety collection of Hercules aircraft. Neither could Australia, perhaps occupied with the same crisis, be relied on to provide the needed naval transport. It is wishful thinking to ignore that reality.
The risk could be more easily accepted had the layoff of Canterbury been caused just by the unavoidable wear and tear of operations on the high seas. But the suspension from service is the result of problems that go back to the ship’s conception at the highest levels of the Defence Ministry and the government. They chose the wrong design.
The result is that the Canterbury is unfit for purpose – to transport troops and materiel to theatres of operation – and in an attempt to remedy those faults the ship will be tied up at Devonport naval base for seven months.
When the Clark government started its search for a naval transporter, around 2004, it decided on a roll-on roll-off ferry design because it was cheaper that a ship specifically configured for defence operations. The result is an expensive disaster.
From almost the beginning of the ship’s deployment, in 2007, its faults have been evident. Ballast and propulsion problems made it difficult to handle in rough conditions, its radar was inadequate and so were its landing craft.
Problems with a boat launching mechanism resulted in Able Seaman Byron Solomon being drowned five months after the commissioning and suddenly Canterbury’s faults were front-page news and the vessel’s inadequacies a matter of political embarrassment.
The following two courts of inquiry and an independent investigation were attempts to contain the political fallout and get to the bottom of the inadequacies of the ship’s performance and of its acquisitioning. The result was a $20 million list of improvements – now costing more – and $85 million in compensation from BAE Systems, the Australian company overseeing the navy’s new ship programme, which includes HMNZS Canterbury.
The Defence Minister, Jonathan Coleman, points out that the Australian payment will cover the remedial work at Devonport, thus avoiding added stress on the New Zealand taxpayer. Coleman also says he expects officials to in future to be ‘‘vigilant about acquisitions’’.
He is too relaxed. What are needed are processes that avoid the mistakes so evident in the conception and design of Canterbury. New Zealand’s defence dollars are too rare to be wasted on another such mess.